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The Drug Debate: Data Exclusivity is the New Way to
Delay Generics

SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN

The article discusses the protection regime for clinical trial data
internationally and outlines the applicable protection regime. In
doing so, this article outlines how the data exclusivity regime can
operate in parallel with the patent regime to add a layer of
protection for the data. Such protection operates at a regulatory
level to delay the entry of generic medications. Internationally, the
data exclusivity regime, which has become an important
contemporary tool in trade negotiations with poorer nations, works
to detrimentally affect access to medication.
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The Drug Debate: Data Exclusivity is the New Way
to Delay Generics
PROFESSOR SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN*

Suppose that the morning edition of the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported about “Company A’s”
new miracle medication, “Drug A,” to cure acne. Clinical trials
conducted on over 3,000 patients showed that Drug A was
generally safe, although teenagers with higher than normal blood
sugar levels may suffer from mild to severe depression as a side
effect. In reality, it might be good for the reader to appreciate that
independent drug information journals repeatedly assert that the
rate of “truly innovative” new medicines range as low as
approximately two percent.1 A vast majority of so-called new
medicines, including those that are protected by patents, typically
represent minor improvements over existing standards.2 That
information aside, any drug, including the exemplar Drug A,
would be subject to regulatory approvals. Thus, in this scenario,
Company A submitted the clinical trial information as part of the
*Srividhya Ragavan is a Professor of Law specializing in intellectual property
and international trade law at Texas A&M University School of Law. She can
be contacted at ragavan.sri@law.tamu.edu.
1

See Brian Godman, et al., Are New Models Needed to Optimize the
Utilization of New Medicines to Sustain Healthcare Systems?, 8 (1) EXPERT
REV.CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 77, 78 (2015) (highlighting that “Prescrire, a
critical independent drug information journal, believed only 2% of new
medicines or new indications for existing medicines in France were innovative
and/or offered a real therapeutic advantage over existing treatments despite the
hype”) (citation omitted).
2
See Editorial, New Drugs, New Indications in 2015: Little Progress, and
Threats to Access to Quality Healthcare for All, 36 (388) PRESCRIRE INT’L
136, 136 (2016),
english.prescrire.org/en/3D3B93E1C3DE20A599FBA073C5442463/Downloa
d.aspx; see also Editorial, New Products and New Indications in 2016: A
System that Favours Imitation Over the Pursuit of Real Progress, 37 (400)
PRESCRIRE INT’L 136, 136 (2017),
english.prescrire.org/en/955912A2E87C92B676874FA2C1354846/Download.
aspx [hereinafter New Products, 2016] (“[L]ittle therapeutic progress was
made in 2016, yet many medicines with no clinical value, uncertain efficacy
or an unfavourable harm-benefit balance were authorised. This is due at least
in part to the current system that drives pharmaceutical research and
development. The primary focus is neither on patients’ needs nor on
delivering genuine therapeutic advances at affordable prices.”).
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statutory requirements for getting marketing approval for Drug
A.
Clinical trial data submitted to federal agencies in support
of the application to approve the marketing of the compound is
critical to prove important elements such as safety and side
effects information of the concerned drug. This article discusses
the protection regime for clinical trial data and the applicable
protection regime. In doing so, this article outlines how the data
exclusivity regime can operate in parallel with the patent regime
to add a layer of protection for the clinical trial data. Such
protection operates at a regulatory level to detrimentally affect
access to medication by delaying the entry of generic
medications. Furthermore, the data exclusivity regime, which has
become an important contemporary tool in trade negotiations
with poorer nations, works internationally to detrimentally affect
access to medication.
The historic origin of the requirement that protects the
exclusivity of Company A’s clinical trial data arose from unfair
competition concerns originally outlined in Article 10bis of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.3 In
essence, Article 10bis establishes “honest practices in industrial
or commercial matters,”4 and prevents actions such as dishonest
manufacturing and other practices that mislead the public as to
the nature and quality of the goods.5 When the World Trade
Organization (WTO)6 was established, the TRIPS Agreement7
incorporated the Paris Convention. Thus, Article 39 (3) of the
3

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10bis, Mar. 20,
1883, last revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1648 [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade
Organization [World Trade Organization], 33 I.L.M 13 (1994) [hereinafter
Marrakesh Agreement]; see also The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2018),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm (providing an overview
of the WTO).
7
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), reprinted in WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365 (1995) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement];
see also Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm; Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 19
U.S.C. § 4201 [hereinafter TRIPS].
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TRIPS Agreement provides protection for “undisclosed test or
other data” submitted to governments or “governmental
agencies” as part of the approval process for marketing of
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products which utilize
new chemical entities.8 The protection is envisaged against unfair
commercial use of “undisclosed test or other data” involving new
chemical entities generated using “considerable effort” and
submitted to government regulators such as the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) or its equivalent in other countries.9
There is one exception, however, and it applies where the
disclosure of the data is deemed necessary to “protect the
public.”10
Operationally, the data exclusivity regime provides a
layer of protection for the data gathered by innovator drug
companies. This protection regime for data operates outside the
realm of patent protection. Thus, the exemplar Company A above
will have two distinct, parallel layers of protection. First, subject
to fulfilling the necessary statutory requirements, Company A
will benefit from patent protection which, if successful, will
allow the company to charge monopoly prices during the patent
term of 20 years.11 Second, Company A will get protection over
the clinical trial data preventing the disclosure of the clinical trial
information during the data exclusivity term.
For innovator pharmaceutical companies like Company
A, protecting the clinical trial data provides an economic
opportunity by creating a new market for the information relating
to the safety of the drug. It also helps provide market exclusivity
for compounds that fail patent scrutiny. Critics point out,
correctly, that pharmaceutical companies prefer to make general
trial information available at the earliest opportunity with a view
to boosting share prices. For example, with Drug A it would be
common for Company A to highlight general trial information
about the drug, such as its ability to cure acne with few side
effects, while omitting severe side effects on segments of the
population, such as minors using asthma medication or children
with diabetes.12 The general amount of clinical trial information
8

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 39.
Id.
10
Id.
11
See generally 35 U.S.C. §101–130.
12
But see New Products, 2016, supra note 2, at 138–39 (asserting how new
products in the year 2016 represented no or limited therapeutic advancement
and discussing how pharmaceuticals are approved for applications without
demanding adequate supporting data of clinical trials).
9
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about drugs is increasing and is pro-actively tracked by health
authorities and venture capitalists for market related reasons,
such as to determine potential funding models.13 Release of
limited but early trial information can allow pharmaceutical
companies to seek more funding for the launch of their new
medicines. However, general disclosures by pharmaceutical
companies aimed at securing funding should be carefully
distinguished from patient data that includes side-effects and
success information, which will remain protected under data
protection laws.
Justification for the protection of clinical trial data is
owed to the success of innovator pharmaceuticals in asserting
that the costs of undertaking clinical trials are considerable, and
can run up to four separate phases involving several patients,
their confidential information, and varying treatment regimes that
can include information on side effects and safety regimens of
the medication. That is, innovator pharmaceutical companies
assert that Company A’s investment to ensure that Drug A is safe
by conducting clinical trials must include the protection of the
generated data. This logic, of course, stands on shaky ground
considering that Company A would typically seek patent
protection, which, if successful, leads to monopoly profits during
the patent term meant to recoup “research and development”
expenses.14 Clinical trials are part of the development process to
13

There is an increasing level of pro-activity among health authorities in
Europe to track new medicines early and feed this information into their
potential funding models. See, e.g., Irene Eriksson et al., The Early Awareness
and Alert System in Sweden: History and Current Status, FRONTIERS IN
PHARMACOLOGY 8:674, at 1, Oct. 5, 2017,
https://doi.org/10.3389/fphar.2017.00674; see also Rickard Malmström et
al., Dabigatran - A Case History Demonstrating the Need for Comprehensive
Approaches to Optimize the Use of New Drugs, FRONTIERS IN
PHARMACOLOGY 4:39 at 2, May 14, 2013,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3653065/ (discussing
the sharing of data between European countries).
14
The role of patent protection in minor innovation and how it detrimentally
affects the cost of medication has become a matter of debate. Researchers and
international organizations have highlighted the importance of access to
medication. See, e.g., Camille Abboud et al., The Price of Drugs for Chronic
Myeloid Leukemia (CML) is a Reflection of the Unsustainable Prices of
Cancer Drugs: From the Perspective of a Large Group of CML Experts, 121
BLOOD JOURNAL 4439, 4441 (2013),
http://www.bloodjournal.org/content/121/22/4439?sso-checked=true (noting
that “[u]naffordable CML drug prices may be preventing many patients from
accessing these lifesaving drugs.”); see also Report of the United Nations
Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Access to Medicines, at 15 (Sep.
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ensure the safety of a chemical compound. That is, clinical trials
determine whether the innovated New Chemical Entity, for
which a patent is filed, is safe to be marketed as a medication.
Conducting clinical trials should therefore be a natural part of the
risk that innovator companies undertake in order to gain the
enormous market benefits that come with patent protection.
Nevertheless, most governments award a drug company
that undertakes clinical trials, typically the innovator drug
company, with a period of “exclusivity” which can range
anywhere from three to eight years.15 In the United States, for
example, the FDA grants New Chemical Entities a total data
exclusivity period of up to five years.16 That is, during the term
when data exclusivity prevails, competing drug companies
cannot get access to the clinical trial data. Importantly, such
access to data is unavailable even when the patent application
fails. Taking the example above, even if Company A’s
compound is found to be unpatentable for whatever reasons, and
hence falls in the public domain, the data from the clinical trial
will remain protected, thus indirectly awarding Company A
market exclusivity. In stock market parlance, this is a situation
where even though the pharmaceutical company has taken a bad
risk in the form of a patent application, data exclusivity provides
adequate insurance for a few years of market exclusivity. Even
2016), http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/ (noting that “[c]ost is one
of the key determinants of access.”); Ed Silverman, Hepatitis C Drugs Remain
Unaffordable in Many Countries, Says WHO Study, STATNEWS, May 31,
2016, https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/05/31/gilead-hepatitis-drugprices-who/ (noting that, for diseases like hepatitis C, in some countries where
drug prices are high, “the total cost of treating everyone would be more than
the cost of all other medicines combined.”); Press Release, World Health
Organization, Over 1 Million Treated With Highly Effective Hepatitis C
Medicines (Oct. 27, 2016),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2016/hepatitis-c-medicines/en/
(noting “huge differences between what countries are paying” for hepatitis C
drugs); Narcyz Ghinea et al., If We Don’t Talk About Value, Cancer Drugs
Will Become Terminal for Health Systems, THE CONVERSATION, July 26,
2015, http://theconversation.com/if-we-dont-talk-about-value-cancer-drugswill-become-terminal-for-healthsystems-44072 (discussing a group of
oncologists urging patients to talk about the price of medications).
15
See 21 U.S.C § 355(b)(1)–(2) under which applications for a new chemical
entity can receive five years of exclusivity; U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON PATENTS AND
EXCLUSIVITY (2018),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm#h
owlongexclusivity (noting a range of exclusivity terms depending on the
nature of the drug).
16
Id.
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though patent protection has failed, which means that a generic
version can be manufactured legally, the clinical trial data
remains protected, thus indirectly providing Company A market
exclusivity on a product which does not enjoy patent protection.
Therefore, generic drug applications of the drug will be delayed,
not because there is a patent on the drug, but because the clinical
trial information is protected by data exclusivity. In this scenario,
generic drug companies are not allowed to access the information
related to a chemical that is in the public domain. For consumers,
Company A’s market exclusivity comes at a financial cost, as
well as at the cost of access to the medication. Of course, generic
drug companies are free to conduct their own clinical trials,
considering that the drug is not a subject of patent protection.
However, such duplication of clinical trials will result in
subjecting a new set of patients to the same clinical trials and
involves additional cost to conduct the trials and delays in
manufacturing the generic drug while trials are being conducted.
Thus, generic drug companies duplicating a clinical trial already
conducted elsewhere will result in duplicative burdens in terms
of time and cost. While the cost of the trial will be added to the
cost of the drug and passed onto consumers by raising the cost of
generic drugs unnecessarily, the delay from duplicating the
clinical trial will result in delaying access to the consumers.
Under circumstances where a chemical gets patent
protection, data exclusivity regimes have slowly morphed into a
weapon resulting in a slow increase in the period of data
exclusivity. For example, in the United States, along with the
original exclusivity awarded for New Chemical Entities, a six
month paediatric exclusivity is added to any existing drug. This
extension attaches at the end of the term if the sponsor submits
paediatric studies on the active moiety in response to a Written
Request from the FDA.17 Similarly, a separate period of seven
years of exclusivity can be awarded under the Orphan Drugs Act
for each use of the drug to treat an orphan condition.18 Recent
17

See 42 U.S.C. § 284m21(c) (2012) (describing that the Commissioner of
Food and Drugs can issue written requests for paediatric studies); 21 U.S.C. §
355a(b)(1) (2012) (stating that “the period during which an application may
not be approved . . . shall be extended by a period of six months after the date
the patent expires[.]”).
18
Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm;
Orphan Drug Act - Relevant Excerpts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditi

8
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research has suggested rampant misuse of this enactment by
companies. National Public Radio reported that more than
seventy drugs approved as Orphan Drugs were in fact “familiar
brand names.”19 Such examples include popular mass market
drugs, such as “the cholesterol blockbuster Crestor, Abilify for
psychiatric conditions, cancer drug Herceptin, and rheumatoid
arthritis drug Humira, the best-selling medicine in the world.”20
Each of these represented the re-approval of a mass market drug
as an orphan drug when its patent was about to expire. Similarly,
there have been instances where the same drug received multiple
“orphan approvals.”22 The approval of drugs with a new orphan
status has caused manufacturers to receive millions of dollars in
government incentives.23 The problem with this is that the seven
additional years of data exclusivity creates a monopoly over a
drug which already benefitted from patent protection, as well as
one layer of data exclusivity, for treating another disease.24
As patents and high drug prices have become increasingly
unpopular,26 pharmaceutical companies and interest groups have
ons/HowtoapplyforOrphanProductDesignation/ucm364750.htm (last updated
Aug. 2013).
19
Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugs For Rare Diseases Have
Become Uncommonly Rich Monopolies, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 17, 2017,
4:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2017/01/17/509506836/drugs-for-rare-diseases-have-becomeuncommonly-rich-monopolies.
20
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id
24
Id.
26
See, e.g., Alan Haycox et al., Patent expiry and costs for anti-cancer
medicines for clinical use : expiry and costs anti-cancer medicines. 6
GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J. 105 (2017), http://gabijournal.net/patent-expiry-and-costs-for-anticancer-medicines-for-clinicaluse.html (finding drastically increased prices for cancer drugs to have only
“marginal health gains” compared with lower priced drugs developed
previously); Donald W. Light & Hagop Kantarjian, Market Spiral Pricing of
Cancer Drugs, 119 CANCER 3900, 3900 (2013),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/ 10.1002/cncr.28321/ (arguing that “cancer
drugs should be priced lower” because there is no data to support the position
that higher prices correlate with added value in new cancer drugs); Ayalew
Tefferi et al., In Support of a Patient-Driven Initiative and Petition to Lower
the High Price of Cancer Drugs, 90 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 996, 997 (2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mayocp.2015.06.001 (warning that high drug
prices “ultimately harm[] patients with cancer and our health care system”);
Narcyz Ghinea et al., If We Don’t Talk About Value, Cancer Drugs Will
Become Terminal for Health Systems, THE CONVERSATION (July 26, 2015,
4:12 PM), http://theconversation.com/if-we-dont-talk-about-value-cancerdrugs-will-become-terminal-for-healthsystems-44072 (giving examples of
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helped morph data exclusivity into a more potent weapon more
often than not, to the detriment of cost of medication and access
to medication.27 The much higher standard of data exclusivity
sought under the now-failed Trans-Pacific Partnership is a great
example.28 In both trade negotiations and free trade agreements
with other countries, the US tends to prefer definitions that
interpret Article 39 of TRIPS more stringently, in a manner
requiring a much higher data protection requirement. The
important aspect to remember is that such compromises need not
be emulated in every market, especially in countries that have a
policy focus on enabling access to medication.29
prominent oncologists in the US and Australia criticizing the rising cost of
cancer medications).
27
E.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Data Exclusivity: A Tool to Sustain Market
Monopoly, 3(5) JINDAL L. REV. 1 (2017); see also Srividhya Ragavan, The
Significance of the Data Exclusivity Debate and its Impact on Generic Drugs,
1 J. INTELL. PROP. STUD. 131, 133–34 (2017) (“Data submitted for marketing
of pharmaceutical . . . products is treated differently partly because of the
powerful lobbies of pharmaceutical corporations and interests they represent
worldwide.”).
28
See Kristina Lybecker, When Patents Aren’t Enough: The Case for Data
Exclusivity for Biologic Medicines, IPWATCHDOG (July 9, 2014),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/09/patents-arent-enough-dataexclusivity-for-biologic-medicines/id=50318/ (“Protecting the intellectual
property of biologics is . . . one of the remaining hurdles in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) Trade Agreement negotiations.”); What Does the TPP Say
About Data Exclusivity and Biosimilars?, MANAGED CARE,
https://www.managedcaremag.com/focus/what-does-tpp-say-about-dataexclusivity-and-biosimilars (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (providing a
contemporaneous account of the TPP negotiations with respect to data
exclusivity).
29
See, e.g., Winnie de Bruijn et al., Introduction and Utilization of
High Priced HCV Medicines across Europe; Implications for the
Future, FRONTIERS IN PHARMACOLOGY, July 2016, at 7,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ PMC4964878/
(explaining that “risk sharing agreements and discounts are used
by health authorities to control budgets, enabling patients to have
access to new high priced medicines”); Maria Phelan & Catherine
Cook, A Treatment Revolution for Those Who Can Afford It?
Hepatitis C treatment: New Medications, Profits and Patients, 14
BMC INFECTIOUS DISEASES S5 (Supp. 6 2014),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4178584/
(discussing how a pharmaceutical company allowed some
countries to make these new medicines available at cost for their
populations or appreciable discounts); Srividhya Ragavan,
Comment, Patients Win Over Patents, HINDU, Mar. 7, 2013,
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/ op-ed/patients-win-overpatents/article4482469.ece (last updated July 21, 2016)
(summarizing an example of Indian government authorities

11
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The question of implementing Article 39 of TRIPS has
current significance for WTO members that are developing
countries. While WTO members have an obligation to protect
data submitted to regulatory bodies, the main objective of Article
39.3’s prescription is to provide members the freedom to define
the terms flexibly.30 Thus, WTO members that are developing
countries should carefully define elements of the article such as
“undisclosed test data,” or, constituents of “unfair commercial
use” in a manner facilitating access to medication.31 For instance,
under the Article 39.3 while members are required to protect data
“against disclosure,” there is nothing to suggest that disclosing
the data to a government regulator should be construed as “unfair
commercial use.” Similarly, WTO members should carve out
clear public interest exceptions to allow for the use of the data.
Developing countries should also follow the pre-TRIPS position
under which most countries allowed reliance on innovator test
data to approve generic products.32 Generic manufacturers had to
prove bioequivalence, which is that that their product was
chemically identical to the brand-name, original product.33 This
approach was consumer-friendly in that it enabled introduction of
generics into the market as soon as the patent expired. The
importance of preserving this traditional approach is underscored
by the recent UN High Level Panel Report on Access to
Medicines,34 the WIPO Development Agenda,35 and the WHO

compelling a multinational pharmaceutical company to license
one of its patented drugs to a local generic manufacturer to ensure
reasonable pricing); Srividhya Ragavan & Raj Dave, Opinion,
The Right Prescription to the IPR Debate, HINDUSTAN TIMES,
Sep. 29, 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-view/the-rightprescription-in-the-ipr-debate/storyaEvB8EGLIsoweSdpozDwBI.html (summarizing the Indian
government’s program of voluntary and compulsory licensing of
high-cost patented drugs).
30
Wael Armouti & Mohammad F.A. Nsour, Data Exclusivity for
Pharmaceuticals: Was It the Best Choice for Jordan Under the U.S.-Jordan
Free Trade Agreement?, 17 OR. REV. INT’L L. 259, 260 (2016).
31
Id.; see also WTO & the Trips Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/wto_trips/en/.
32
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7.
33
See Ragavan, Data Exclusivity, supra note 27, at 16–17.
34
See Report of the United Nations High Level Panel Report on Access to
Medicines, UNITED NATIONS, (Sept. 2016),
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/.
35
See generally Development Agenda for WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/.

2018]

THE DRUG DEBATE

12

studies,36 all of which also highlight the importance of access to
medicines. It is a documented fact that generics have not only
been able to save costs, but also enable access to medication in
several parts of the world.37
Lastly, developing countries should avoid instituting
“patent linkage,” the tying-in of patent information with data
exclusivity.38 Countries such as the United States provide for
patent linkage, which essentially prevents regulators such as the
FDA from approving a competing product during the patent
term.39 When a generic drug company submits an application to
get marketing approval, the FDA will process the application
only if there is no valid patent on the application material. When
36

See Ed Silverman, Hepatitis C Drugs Remain Unaffordable in Many
Countries, Says WHO Study, STAT: PHARMALOT (May 31, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/05/31/gilead-hepatitis-drug-priceswho/ (discussing a WHO study that examined the 2015 prices for certain
drugs in over 30 countries); Over 1 Million Treated with Highly Effective
Hepatitis C Medicines, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 27, 2016),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2016/hepatitis-c-medicines/en/
(discussing a WHO report on access to Hepatitis C treatments).
37
See, e.g., Alexandra Cameron et al., Switching from Originator Brand
Medicines to Generic Equivalents in Selected Developing Countries: How
Much Could Be Saved?, 15 VALUE IN HEALTH 664, 671 (2012) (explaining the
results of a study demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of generics and urging
governments to “consider intervening . . . to improve access to affordable
medicines”); Brian Godman et al., Multiple Policies to Enhance Prescribing
Efficiency for Established Medicines in Europe with a Particular Focus on
Demand Side Measures: Findings and Future Implications, 5 FRONTIERS IN
PHARMACOLOGY 1, 5–6 (2014) (highlighting some of the policies that Europe
pursued to maintain universal health care); Brian Godman et al., Payers
Endorse Generics to Enhance Prescribing Efficiency: Impact and Future
Implications, a Case History Approach, 1 GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS
INITIATIVE J. 69, 75 (2012) (asserting that the savings from generics when
compared with the originator are considerable); Generics Could Cut Costs of
Cancer Drugs by Over 99%, GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (Apr. 4,
2017), http://www.gabionline.net/Generics/Research/Generics-could-cutcosts-of-cancer-drugs-by-over-99 (describing a study that suggested
“significant price reductions” for cancer drugs through the use of generics).
38
Ravikant Bhardwaj et al., The Impact of Patent Linkage on Marketing of
Generic Drugs, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 316, 316 (2013); G. Lee Skillington
& Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required by Article
39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 34 (2003).
39
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E), (j)(5)(F) (2012) (providing limited
protection from competition for new drug applications); see also Small
Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions for New Drug Product
Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 11, 2016),
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssi
stance/ucm069962.htm (explaining 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E), (j)(5)(F), also
known as “new drug product exclusivity”).
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the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in the United States in 1984,
innovator pharmaceutical companies realized that they could not
deny generic drugs market access for much longer and hence,
patent linkage was proposed as an alternative to delay the entry
of generic competition.40
Developing countries should appreciate that patent
linkage results in delaying the entry of generic competition
because marketing approval cannot be obtained for
manufacturing the product until the patent expires. Thus, from
the time the patent expires and until the generic drug is cleared
for the market, the innovator will indirectly enjoy a market
monopoly even after the patent expires. Therefore, countries such
as India, which predominantly houses a generic drug industry,
and other countries such as Brazil and Chile, which provide
Universal Health Coverage, would be disadvantaged by patent
linkage because it largely serves to delay generic drug companies
from entering into the market. One of the best examples for
determining the question of patent linkage is India where the
question arose in relation to the approval of a generic version of
“sorafenib tosylate” used to treat renal cell cancer.41 Bayer, the
patent owner, wanted India to prevent Cipla from being granted
marketing approval.42 Bayer asserted that the TRIPS Agreement
necessitated the establishment of patent linkage to prevent the
Drug Controller from approving the marketing of drugs whose
patent was not owned by the applicant, Cipla. The Delhi High
Court was persuaded by the presence of a Bolar Provision under
Section 107A of the Indian Patents Act of 1970, which
specifically exempted the use of data for regulatory approval
from infringement with a view to permit immediate availability
of generic drugs in the market when the patent expires.43 On
appeal, the Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the Delhi
High Court and rejected the applicability of patent linkage in
India. Nevertheless, the United States has repeatedly sought to

40

D. Christopher Ohly & Sailesh K. Patel, There is No Orange Book: The
Coming Wave of Biological Therapeutics, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 464,
476–77 (2011) (explaining that innovator companies sought data exclusivity as
a “quid pro quo” for permitting more generic access).
41
Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, WP(C) No.7833/2008 (Delhi H.C. Aug. 18,
2009),
http://www.manupatra.com/manufeed/contents/PDF/633862911775465000.pd
f.
42
Id. at 2.
43
Id. at 12.
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pressure India under the Special 301 process to recognize patent
linkage on the grounds that Article 39 of TRIPS requires it.44
In reality, patent linkage also affects the operation of
compulsory licenses, which remains an important tool to tackle
public health crises in developing countries. When there is a
public health crisis, the presence of patent linkage can operate to
prevent a regulator from approving drugs that may be necessary
to resolve the crisis. Considering that data exclusivity, as a tool,
detrimentally affects generic competition, it is no coincidence
that the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
continually pressures developing countries to either extend or
increase existing data exclusivity periods.45 Hence, it is
especially critical that countries appreciate the limits of the
flexibilities involved in the international obligations relating to
protection of test data. The bottom line is Article 39.3 of the
TRIPS Agreement is certainly not worded to impose restrictions
such that data exclusivity becomes a hurdle to public health. In
any case, considering that the access-to-medication question has
become a burden that TRIPS continues to bear poorly, it is
critical for countries that either focus on access to medication or
house a robust generic drug industry to chart their own courses
under Article 39.3.
The End
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